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Freitas after Villegas: Are "Sneak-and-
Peek" Search Warrants Clandestine
Fishing Expeditions?
INTRODUCTION
In 1984, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents ob-
tained a search warrant to surreptitiously enter and search a house
in Northern California to confirm the presence of an illegal
methamphetamine laboratory.1 At trial, in United States v. Freitas,2
the defendants argued the covert search intruded into their constitu-
tionally protected privacy interest.3 The evidence was suppressed.
The suppression was upheld on appeal because the search warrant
used4 failed to provide for reasonable postsearch notice.5
In 1987, DEA agents in New York obtained a similar warrant.6
The warrant authorized surreptitious entry into private premises to
confirm the presence of an alleged cocaine factory.7 At trial, in
United States v. Villegas,8 the court acknowledged the standards
1. United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1986); see also text
accompanying notes 32-50.
2. 610 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1985), rev'd and remanded, United States v.
Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1986).
3. Freitas, 610 F. Supp. at 1563-64.
4. Incriminating evidence was observed during the covert entry, and this provided
probable cause for a second "regular" search warrant. The trial court suppressed the
evidence gathered at the subsequent search because of the prior unconstitutional entry.
Id. at 1573.
5. Freitas, 800 F.2d at 1456.
6. United States v. Villegas, 700 F. Supp. 94, 96 (N.D.N.Y. 1988); see also text
accompanying notes 60-69.
7. Villegas, 700 F. Supp. at 96.
8. Id. at 94.
enunciated by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in California, and
distinguished Villegas because the warrant contained a provision
mandating a return within seven days.' The court held that the war-
rant's notice provision removed any constitutional defect.10
This Note looks at the potential effects of the Second Circuit's
decision on the area of covert warrants in the Ninth Circuit, and
examines the constitutionality of these warrants. Part I places sur-
reptitious search warrants within the development of the fourth
amendment and explains why Title III of the Omnibus Crime Con-
trol and Safe Streets Act of 1968 should be relevant in determining
their constitutionality. Part II summarizes the Freitas cases and
their impact on the subsequent cases of United States v. Johns and
United States v. Villegas. Part III analyzes the constitutionality of
surreptitious searches. Specifically, Part III addresses the notice and
necessity requirements of Title III and argues that both these re-
quirements should be met to render the warrant constitutional. Part
III also briefly discusses other constitutional problems related to cov-
ert warrants. Part IV discusses the likely effect of the Freitas and
Villegas cases on future decisions of the Ninth Circuit. Finally, Part
V discusses the utility of covert search warrants, taking note of some
justifications advanced for their usage, and recommends, because of
the dangers inherent in the nature of covert warrants, their issuance
be strictly limited in order to comport with the fourth amendment.
I. SURREPTITIOUS SEARCHES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A surreptitious" search is a search of property or premises con-
ducted without the knowledge or consent of the owners or residents.
It is also known as a covert search,'12 a secret search, and, more re-
cently, a sneak-and-peek search. 3 A surreptitious search generally
9. Id. at 98.
10. "The warrant in this case is distinct from those in Freitas... in that it does
provide for a return within seven days. . . .The Court in Freitas I, specifically noted
that inclusion of such a provision would allow such warrants to pass constitutional mus-
ter." Id. (citing United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986)).
il. "Surreptitious" is defined as: "Performed, made, or acquired by secret, clan-
destine, or stealthy means." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1224 (2d college ed.
1976).
12. For an excellent overall discussion on the use of covert searches, see Note,
Covert Searches, 39 STAN. L. REV. 545 (1987).
The author notes there has been a considerable increase in covert entries by FBI and
DEA agents in a variety of criminal investigations. Id. at 546. Both agencies have dis-
tributed guidelines for covert searches to their agents. Id. at 546 n.7. However, the Frei-
tas cases appear to be the first to squarely address the legality of a sneak-and-peek
warrant.
13. In United States v. Johns, 851 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1988), when a surreptitious
search of a rented storage unit took place, a federal court, apparently for the first time,
recognized the term "sneak-and-peek." The court used this term to describe the warrant
which authorized the agents to enter the storage unit, to examine the unit, and to take
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does not contemplate a seizure of evidence, but merely allows agents
or officers to observe or verify a receptacle's or a premise's interior
contents. A surreptitious search warrant may allow activity that the
fourth amendment was designed to guard against, and thus these
warrants should be limited in their issuance and application.
The fourth amendment was added to the Bill of Rights in 1791 to
ensure the practice, prevalent in England, of issuing general war-
rants was not continued in the United States. 4 The amendment has
two major clauses, the unreasonable searches and seizures clause,
and the warrants clause."5 The warrants clause states: "no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." 6 The warrants clause requires a
description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized. It
is therefore arguable that a surreptitious entry violates the very let-
ter of the fourth amendment because it does not contemplate the
seizure of a person or a thing.
The express requirement that the seized objects be particularly de-
scribed was intended to make impossible the type of general searches
abhorred by the colonists. An agent or officer executing the warrant
should not have the discretion to choose which areas to search and
which objects to seize. For example, in a surreptitious entry to con-
firm the presence of a drug laboratory, in which DEA agents are
free to roam the premises of a person's residence without the owner's
inventory of its contents, without notifying the owner.
14. Schroeder, The Warrants Clause: The Key to the Castle, FED. PROBATION,
Mar. 1985, at 65.
General warrants were a source of discontent in Great Britain, and in 1765, in the case
of Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Trials 1030, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765), this
practice was held invalid. The court, in Entick, held that issuing general warrants consti-
tuted a trespass, that a specific grant of power was required, and a general warrant was
not such a grant. Schroeder, supra, at 65. The fourth amendment took effect in 1791 but
was not interpreted for almost a century. The Supreme Court first interpreted the
amendment's protections in the 1886 case of Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886), but not until the 1961 case of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), was the
framework of the amendment given enough substance to ensure the protections afforded
would have some practical effect.
15. The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend IV.
16. Id.
knowledge, the need for a particularized description of the places to
be searched and the objects to be seized is critical. In such an in-
stance, there is a greater danger of impermissible invasion than in a
"regular" search, which gives the owner or resident notice of the
search and thus the ability to protest if his or her constitutional
rights are invaded.
The fourth amendment protects not only property rights but the
right to privacy as well.17 In Sequra v. United States,8 the Supreme
Court noted a search constitutes an even greater invasion of privacy
than a seizure of evidence.' 9 A search warrant authorizing an agent
to secretly enter the private residence of a citizen during the night to
look for evidence and then depart without leaving notice of the visit
is an intrusion into the privacy right. These sneak-and-peek warrants
appear to be analogous to the general warrants that the fourth
amendment was designed to protect against.
As technology advanced, police surveillance techniques became in-
creasingly sophisticated and facilitated intrusions into aspects of peo-
ple's lives that were once considered private. Wiretapping and elec-
tronic eavesdropping became common investigative tools. In Katz v.
United States,20 the Supreme Court rejected the notion that there
must be a physical trespass to trigger the protection of the fourth
amendment, and held that recording a defendant's telephone conver-
sation constituted a search and seizure because it violated the pri-
vacy Katz justifiably relied on when entering an enclosed phone
booth."'
Congress reacted to the new technological developments by ensur-
ing this intrusive practice be a highly regulated activity. It enacted
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968.2" Under the Act, various officials may authorize an application
to a federal judge for an order allowing wiretapping or electronic
eavesdropping to discover evidence of specific federal crimes.2 3 Evi-
dence obtained though the lawful execution of the order may be ad-
17. Prior to the 1960s, the fourth amendment appeared to protect only property
rights. The Supreme Court defined private rights in terms of property rights. However, in
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), the Court acknowledged that property inter-
ests alone do not trigger the protection of the fourth amendment. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961), the Court explicitly recognized the right to privacy created by the
fourth amendment.
18. 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
19. Id. at 806.
20. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
21. Id. at 353.
22. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82
Stat. 212 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1988)).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1988) (authorization for interception of wire, oral, or elec-
tronic communications only for specified federal offenses).
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missible in court.24
Under section 2518 of the Act, before an interception order is
granted, the judge must determine whether the applicants attempted
to use normal investigative procedures.2" If normal procedures were
attempted but failed, or if they had to be abandoned because of the
danger inherent in the particular situation, the judge can take these
factors into account and still grant the warrant.26 Section 2518 also
provides that notice must be served on the intercepted party within a
reasonable time.27 These requirements of "necessity" and "notice"
are important limitations placed on wiretapping and electronic sur-
veillance to ensure this activity remains within the mandates of the
fourth amendment.
Surreptitious entries to verify evidence of criminality have been
24. Id. § 2515 (prohibition of use of intercepted wire or oral communications as
evidence).
25. Id. § 2518 (procedure for interception of wire or oral communications). Section
2518 states:
(I) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the interception
of a wire, oral, or electronic communication under this chapter shall be made
in writing upon oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction and
shall state the applicant's authority to make such application. Each application
shall include the following information:
(c). a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative
procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be
unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous;
Id. at (1)(c).
26. Id.
27. Id. § 2518(8)(d). Section (8)(d) states:
Within a reasonable time but not later than ninety days after the filing of an
application for an order of approval under section 2518(7)(b) which is denied
or the termination of the period of an order or extensions thereof, the issuing or
denying judge shall cause to be served, on the persons named in the order or
the application, and such other parties to intercepted communications as the
judge may determine in his discretion that is in the interest of justice, an inven-
tory which shall include notice of-.
(I) the fact of the entry of the order or application;
(2) the date of the entry and the period of authorized, approved or disap-
proved interception, or the denial of the application; and
(3) the fact that during the period wire, oral, or electronic communications
were or were not intercepted.
The judge, upon the filing of a motion, may in his discretion make available to
such person or his counsel for inspection such portions of the intercepted com-
munications, applications and orders as the judge determines to be in the inter-
est of justice. On an ex parte showing of good cause to a judge of competent
jurisdiction the serving of the inventory required by this subsection may be
postponed.
Id.
analogized to electronic surveillance.2 8 Each is an extraordinary
search calling into question all of the basic protections afforded by
the fourth amendment. The government itself has analogized the
surreptitious search in such a way.29 Although Title III is not di-
rectly applicable, one court has held that its limitations show the
minimum standards required in order for surreptitious entries to
comport with the fourth amendment. 30
An official covert entry into the private residence of a citizen, at
night, to determine the status of evidence sought to be seized later, is
an extraordinary procedure. The entry impacts the right of privacy
guaranteed by the fourth amendment and could "constitute. . .a
dangerous and radical threat to civil rights and to the security of all
our homes and persons."31
Assuming surreptitious entries can be constitutional under certain
conditions and Title III regulations are applicable, those regulations
should be stringently enforced. In particular, the notice and necessity
requirements should be required in order for sneak-and-peek
searches and entries to be constitutional.
II. THE CASES
A. Freitas I and II
In the summer of 1984, DEA agents received an anonymous tele-
phone tip indicating Raymond Freitas was running a
methamphetamine laboratory at his home in Clearlake, California.32
In October, Clearlake Deputy Sheriffs notified the DEA that a hose
connected the Freitas house to the nearby lake and that neighbors
reported strong odors around the house.33
In December, the still anonymous informant told the DEA Freitas
was assembling equipment to begin manufacturing
methamphetamine3 4 DEA agents conducted an independent investi-
gation at Clearlake and ascertained Freitas was loading equipment,
members of his party were purchasing large blocks of ice commonly
used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, a hose connected the
Freitas house to the lake (perhaps facilitating disposal of waste prod-
28. United States v. Freitas, 610 F. Supp. 1560, 1570 (N.D. Cal. 1985), rev'd and
remanded, United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1986).
29. Freitas, 610 F. Supp. at 1570. The government relied on rulings in several
wiretapping and electronic surveillance cases to bolster its position that a surreptitious
intrusion for the purpose of establishing information about suspected criminal activity
does not violate constitutional constraints.
30. Id. at 1571.
31. Freitas, 800 F.2d at 1458 (Poole, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 1452.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1453.
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ucts from the suspected laboratory), and windows on the ground
floor of the house were covered.35
Based on the above sequence of events plus his knowledge of Frei-
tas's prior arrests in connection with cocaine and
methamphetamine, 36 DEA special agent Stephen Woods procured
eight search warrants on December 12, 1984. These warrants al-
lowed agents to search Freitas's homes and storage lockers. The war-
rants expired on December 16th.31 However, on December 13th, spe-
cial agent Laura Hayes was granted a "surreptitious entry" warrant
for the Clearlake house on the grounds it would assist the DEA in
"determin [ing] the status of the suspected clandestine
methamphetamine laboratory." 8 The magistrate granted the war-
rant, using a conventional warrant form he modified by striking out
a description of the property to be seized and the requirement that
copies of the warrant and an inventory of the property seized be left
at the house.39 The warrant did not require notice be given to the
owners nor did the affidavit accompanying the warrant request assert
a need for the warrant based on a claim of necessity. The surrepti-
tious entry took place on December 13th.40
On December 17, a day after Agent Woods' warrants expired, an
extension was granted on those warrants based on the probable cause
obtained from the December 13th surreptitious entry into Freitas's
house.4 On December 20, DEA agents arrested Freitas, the owner
of the property, along with other defendants and seized property as
evidence.42
At trial, the defendants argued the initial covert search was an
unconstitutional intrusion which tainted the evidence obtained from
the second search.4 3 The trial court agreed and suppressed the evi-
35. Id.
36. In May 1980, Freitas was arrested for importing seven pounds of cocaine and
in January 1982, he was arrested for attempting to involve his brother-in-law in a
methamphetamine-making scheme. See id. at 1452.






43. Freitas, 610 F. Supp. at 1563-73.
Freitas moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the second search. He first chal-
lenged the validity of the original search warrants, issued on December 12, claiming
there was not probable cause or facts were intentionally or recklessly omitted from the
affidavit, rendering it substantially misleading. The court concluded "the informant's tips
were sufficiently reliable under the 'totality of the circumstances' to affirm the magis-
dence."4 In reaching its conclusion, the court analogized a surrepti-
tious entry to electronic surveillance regulated by Title III, and con-
cluded the lack of notice and necessity, as required by Title III,
violated the fourth amendment. 45
On appeal, Freitas 1, the Ninth Circuit agreed Title III applied to
clarify the probable constitutional importance of both the necessity
for the surreptitious search and the need for subsequent notice. 46 The
court held that a failure to expressly provide for notice Within a short
time of the entry was a constitutional defect but refused to hold that
a showing of necessity was constitutionally required.47 The case was
remanded to determine whether the good-faith exception could be
invoked.48
On remand, the district court again concluded evidence derived
from the covert entry was tainted and ordered suppression.49 The
trate's finding of probable cause," and Freitas failed to meet the burden necessary for a
hearing as to the validity of these warrants. Id. at 1566, 1568.
Freitas also objected to the surreptitious entry and argued for exclusion of evidence
derived from the original warrants. The court determined the "surreptitious entry was
invalidly authorized," and the warrant was constitutionally infirm. Id. at 1570-71.
44. Id. at 1573. The court held the lack of a notice provision in the warrant vio-
lated the fourth amendment of the Constitution and since the extension warrants had
been issued based in part on the knowledge gained from the surreptitious entry, all subse-
quent evidence arising out of these searches was to be suppressed.
45. Freitas, 800 F.2d at 1454.
46. Id. at 1456. The court noted that although Title III has thus far been held to
apply only to aural interception of communication and not to visual observations, Title
III nevertheless appears to clarify the "probable constitutional importance" of both the
necessity of conducting a covert search and the subsequent notice that must be given.
47. Id. The court believed that the absence of a notice requirement in the warrant
presented a more difficult issue than the necessity requirement. See id. at 1456. The
court expressly concluded that "we do not hold that a showing of necessity is constitu-
tionally required in a case such as is before us." Id. This Note suggests that the Freitas I
court should have found that such a showing is vital to upholding the constitutionality of
a sneak-and-peek warrant because to hold otherwise is to erode the protection of the
fourth amendment.
48. According to United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), evidence may not be
suppressed when agents have acted in "objectively reasonable reliance" on a warrant
later found to be defective, unless the affidavit supporting the warrant is "so lacking in
indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable"
(quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-611 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in
part)), or the warrant is "so facially deficient. . .that the executing officers cannot rea-
sonably presume it to be valid." Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23.
49. The district court found the warrant to be so facially flawed that "objective
reasonable reliance" could not be established. The court determined that although the
DEA agents had sought the advice and approval of an Assistant U.S. Attorney, and had
advised the magistrate of the surreptitious nature of the warrant, that the agents were
unaware of any similar covert warrants being issued in other districts and that there had,
in fact, been no similar issuance of warrants. Freitas, 856 F.2d 1425, 1427 (9th Cir.
1988) (Freitas II).
The court thus concluded that "the flaw on the face of the warrant was so basic that
no reasonably well-trained law enforcement officer could have acted in objectively rea-
sonable reliance on the warrant" and that approval by a federal prosecutor and authori-
zation by the magistrate were insufficient to establish objectively reasonable reliance so
as to invoke the good-faith exception. Id.
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case was again appealed. In Freitas II, the Ninth Circuit conducted
a de novo review and concluded there was sufficient evidence to es-
tablish that the agent's behavior was objectively reasonable, and
therefore fell within the good-faith exception.50 The court reiterated
its holding in Freitas I, that the original warrant was constitutionally
defective because it failed to provide for postsearch notice. The court
did not address the necessity requirement.
B. United States v. Johns5"
FBI agent John White allegedly detected unusual odors associated
with the manufacture of methamphetamine coming from defendant
Johns's storage unit. 52 White procured a search warrant to surrepti-
tiously enter and examine the storage unit without removing any evi-
dence. Certain chemicals and equipment commonly utilized in the
production of methamphetamine were found.53 At trial, Johns moved
to suppress the evidence because of allegedly willful or reckless false
statements in the affidavit.54 The motion was denied, and Johns en-
tered a conditional guilty plea.55 The Freitas case then came to trial,
and Johns moved for reconsideration of his earlier motion to sup-
press the evidence based on the district court's decision. He con-
tended the covert nature of the warrant violated the fourth
amendment.56
The court characterized the surreptitious entry as a "sneak-and-
peek" warrant 57 and held that because the warrant to enter the stor-
age unit was indistinguishable from the warrant in Freitas, it too
violated the fourth amendment for the reasons given in Freitas.5 8
The Johns court appeared to accept the Freitas court's analysis of
the constitutionality of the sneak-and-peek warrant. The court ac-
knowledged the notice requirement had not been met, but did not
raise any questions as to necessity. The case was remanded for an
evidentiary hearing on the agent's good faith, to decide whether the
evidence should still be admitted under the good-faith exception to
50. Id, at 1428.
51. 851 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1988).
52. Id. at 1132.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1133.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1134.
58. Id. at 1135.
the exclusionary rule.59
C. United States v. Villegase°
In May of 1987, DEA agents surreptitiously entered and searched
Villegas's farm in New York, pursuant to a search warrant issued to
allow confirmation of the existence of illegal activity.61 The support-
ing affidavit stated a confidential source informed the government of
a cocaine factory in the general vicinity of Villegas's farm and subse-
quent independent government investigations corroborated the infor-
mation.62 On July 14, 1987, pursuant to a regular search warrant,
agents seized quantities of cocaine in various stages of manufacture
and arrested Villegas and other defendants.6 3
Defendants contended a search without a seizure is a "fishing ex-
pedition" that by its very nature violates the fourth amendment. 64
The trial court noted covert warrants constituted an issue of first
impression in the Second Circuit and only the Ninth Circuit had
addressed their propriety.65
The Villegas court acknowledged the Ninth Circuit found sneak-
and-peek warrants without appropriate limitations violated the
fourth amendment. The Villegas court then distinguished the war-
rant before it from those in Freitas and Johns. Unlike those war-
rants, it provided for a return within seven days66 and, under Freitas
1, the "inclusion of such a provision would allow such warrants to
pass constitutional muster."6 7
The Villegas court found the inclusion of an affidavit supporting
the necessity of the surreptitious warrant, together with the provision
for a return, sufficient to prevent the warrant from violating constitu-
tional restrictions.6 8 The court noted Freitas I acknowledged a neces-
sity requirement would strengthen the claim of constitutionality."
59. Id. The defendants alleged that the information leading to the discovery of the
equipment came from an informant and not an inadvertent discovery. They contended
the agents could not have inadvertently detected what they claimed to have smelled. The
court acknowledged sufficient doubt as to the agents' good faith did exist and thus re-
manded the case.
60. 700 F. Supp. 94 (N.D.N.Y. 1988).
61. Id. at 96.
62. Id. at 99.
63. Id. at 96.
64. Id. at 97.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 98.
67. Id. (citing United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986)).
68. Id.
69. Id. This author believes the necessity requirement should not be used merely to
strengthen the claim of constitutionality, but should be an absolute requirement in order
to meet the threshold of constitutionality.
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SNEAK-AND-PEEK SEARCHES
In Freitas I, the court cited Dalia v. United States0 as standing
for the proposition that the fourth amendment does not prohibit all
surreptitious entries.71 In Dalia, petitioner's (defendant's) business
office was electronically monitored pursuant to a warrant 7 2 While
the warrant approved the surveillance, it did not explicitly authorize
a covert entry to install the device. FBI agents had secretly entered
the office and spent three hours installing the bug, and petitioner
based his motion to suppress all evidence derived from the bug on
that unauthorized physical intrusion into his business premises.
73
Arguably, the Dalia holding should be strictly limited to its facts.
The Dalia court was addressing electronic surveillance, a practice
that had already been subjected to legislative scrutiny. Secret entry
into a private residence to ascertain the status of evidence is a differ-
ent, more intrusive, practice than a secret entry which seeks to
"seize" incriminating conversations that there is probable cause to
believe will take place.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Dalia holding can be extended to
sneak-and-peek entries (as the Freitas court apparently assumed
without explaining the basis for doing so), the holding should still be
read restrictively. Dalia does not assert that all surreptitious entries
are constitutional, but merely that the fourth amendment does not
prohibit all such entries. There are still stringent requirements that
should be met.
A. The Notice Requirement
Citing Irvine v. California7 4 and Silverman v. United States,7 5 the
Dalia court held that covert entries are constitutional in some in-
stances, at least if made pursuant to a warrant, and that the lack of
prior notice does not render the warrant unconstitutional if such an
announcement would provoke escape of the suspect or the destruc-
tion of critical evidence. 6 The Dalia court concluded petitioner's ar-
gument, that lack of notice rendered the entry unconstitutional, was
70. 441 U.S. 238 (1979).
71. Freitas, 800 F.2d at 1456.
72. Dalia, 441 U.S. at 241-242.
73. Id. at 245.
74. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
75. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
76. Dalia, 441 U.S. at 247 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355 n.16
(1967)).
frivolous.7 7 However, the court qualified its statement by citing
United States v. Donovan,7 8 which held that substituting postsearch
notice to those subjected to surveillance renders the initial lack of
notice constitutional. 9 In Freitas II, the court said if the warrant
had provided for notice within seven days after the search it would
not have crossed the constitutional line, thus implicitly accepting the
conclusion in Donovan.80
Assuming Dalia's result, upholding the constitutionality of covert
entries in order to install electronic surveillance devices, is validly
extended to surreptitious entries and searches such as those in Frei-
tas, Johns, and Villegas, it appears the inclusion of a provision for
postsearch notice will cure the constitutional defect of lack of prior
notice. However, curing the notice defect, by itself, should not render
the warrant constitutional.
B. The Necessity Requirement
In Dalia, the Court limited the term "covert entry" to "the physi-
cal entry by a law enforcement officer into premises without the
Owner's permission or knowledge in order to install bugging equip-
ment."81 The trial court noted, generally, the most successful way to
install the device is through breaking and entering.82 Thus Dalia im-
plicitly comports with the necessity requirement set forth in Title
III, as the device probably could not be installed without a covert
entry.
In Freitas, however, the surreptitious entry was made to "deter-
mine the status of the suspected clandestine methamphetamine labo-
ratory. 's3 The agents desired to secretly enter the defendant's prop-
erty in order to establish probable cause for a subsequent warrant.
There was no showing of necessity in the affidavit for the covert war-
rant.84 The Freitas I court stated that if necessity had been an im-
77. Id. at 248.
78. 429 U.S. 413 (1977).
79. Id. at 429 n.19 ("In addition to these provisions for mandatory and discretion-
ary inventory notice, the Government is required to supply the issuing judge with record-
ings of the intercepted conversations, which are to be sealed according to his directions.
18 U.S.C. Section 2518(8)(d). These notice and return provisions satisfy constitutional
requirements.").
80. United States v. Freitas, 856 F.2d 1425, 1456 (9th Cir. 1988).
81. Dalia, 441 U.S. at 241 n.2 (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 248 n.8.
83. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1453 n.l (9th Cir. 1986).
84. In Note, supra note 12, at 550 n.24, the author notes that the Freitas litigation
involved a showing of the government's interests in surreptitious entries. A declaration of
D. Largent, a DEA special agent, was submitted with the government's motion for the
court to reconsider the suppression order. The declaration itemized some of these inter-
ests. The government wished to conduct a surreptitious search because of safety concerns
relating to the agents' subsequent raid, and relating to the carcinogenic effects of flam-
mable chemicals and the disposal of toxic by-products from the methamphetamine pro-
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portant reason for issuing the warrant, the argument the warrant did
not violate the fourth amendment would be stronger. However, the
court refused to hold that necessity was a constitutional prerequisite
in a case such as Freitas.5
The Villegas court, in analyzing the constitutionality of the sneak-
and-peek warrant, construed Freitas as holding that had there been
provision for notice, the surreptitious entry would have been consti-
tutional, and did not address the necessity issue in much depth. The
court noted the inclusion of an affidavit supporting the necessity of
the covert nature of the warrant strengthened the claim of constitu-
tionality, but did not mandate a necessity requirement in all issu-
ances of sneak-and-peek warrants. 86
A necessity requirement should be vital to preserve the constitu-
tionality of a covert entry. If the "necessity" does not rise to the level
required by the Constitution, the mere showing that it will be more
convenient or safer to covertly entry prior to a regular search and
seizure should not suffice for the warrant to pass constitutional mus-
ter. In many complex operations, especially those relating to the ille-
gal manufacture of drugs, agents want to secretly "case" the prem-
ises to determine the status of the laboratory, its exact location in
the premises, the presence of weapons, and other relevant informa-
tion that facilitates a more efficient and less dangerous subsequent
regular search. While it is understandable that the covert search is a
desirable weapon in the agents' eyes, the search is nevertheless a se-
vere intrusion into the alleged criminals' privacy. Agents may be
mistaken in their identification of the suspects, or in the identifica-
tion of a personal residence as a drug laboratory. The level of neces-
sity required before a regular search warrant is forsaken should
therefore be one of strict or absolute necessity. The fourth amend-
ment protects all citizens' homes, including those of suspected felons,
from arbitrary invasion by government agents.
duction. However, even though these may be legitimate safety reasons supporting the
agents' preference for a covert warrant over a regular warrant, the affidavit did not show
a specific necessity justifying the covert warrant in this particular case. See also text
accompanying notes 96-100.
85. Freitas, 800 F.2d at 1456.
86. The Villegas court stated that "[t]he recognized problem with... clandestine
searches is the lack of notice to the party whose privacy had been invaded. . . ." United
States v. Villegas, 700 F. Supp. 94, 97 (N.D.N.Y. 1988). The court did not address the
level of necessity claimed by the affidavit.
C. Analysis of an Absolute Necessity Requirement
An application for a surreptitious warrant could be required to
attain a higher level of justification than the probable cause needed
for a regular warrant, to compensate for the lack of prior notice to
citizens affected by the search.87 If there is a sufficient showing to
meet this higher level of justification, the official issuing the warrant
should ascertain why the agents are not seizing the incriminating
evidence at that time instead of using the extraordinary clandestine
search. Arguably, only once there is a showing of absolute necessity
for a surreptitious entry, rather than a regular entry, should a covert
warrant be granted.
If a surreptitious entry is erroneously conducted, mere subsequent
notice to the affected party should not serve to render constitutional
what otherwise is most likely unconstitutional. If absolute necessity
must be shown at the outset, a subsequent erroneous entry has at
least met a higher initial standard; absolute necessity serves as a pro-
tection against arbitrary surreptitious intrusions.
D. Invasion of Privacy and Other Potential Dangers
The right of privacy has developed both in the Court's interpreta-
tion and application of the two fourth amendment clauses and in the
more general penumbra of privacy permeating the Constitution.88 As
earlier contended, covert warrants resemble the abhorred general
warrants the drafters of the fourth amendment intended to abolish.89
A sneak-and-peek warrant has the potential to bestow on law en-
forcement agents unlimited license to rifle through a person's private
residence without the owner's knowledge or consent. There is no
check on agents' actions to ensure they comply with the action de-
scribed in the affidavit. If a search is covert, the owner is not present
to observe the actions of the agents and thus has no means to ques-
tion or contest the search.
87. The fourth amendment has been interpreted as allowing some flexibility in
what constitutes justification for an intrusion. An entry pursuant to a building inspection,
or searches pursuant to a stop-and-frisk, require lesser degrees of justification than prob-
able cause to remain within constitutional limits because these are arguably less intrusive
practices. However, a sneak-and-peek warrant is an unusually severe intrusion and
should require a higher level of justification than regular probable cause. Justice Stewart
noted in his concurrence in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), in which a New
York eavesdropping law was held unconstitutional, that the circumstances in the affidavit
would have been adequate to meet the probable cause necessary for a conventional
search or arrest but that it did not rise to the level of probable cause needed for the
intrusive practice of eavesdropping. Id. at 69-70. This argument has not prevailed in the
lower courts, however, but the Supreme Court has not yet addressed this issue.
88. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
89. See supra note 14.
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There is also the possibility agents may come across incriminating
evidence they had not expected to find. In Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire,90 the Court allowed the seizure of unnamed items if, in the
course of a lawful search, the police inadvertently came across other
articles of an incriminating nature in "plain view." This doctrine
renders otherwise inadmissible evidence admissible, notwithstanding
that police had no probable cause to believe the incriminating evi-
dence was present in the residence when the search warrant was ob-
tained. There are limits to this doctrine. The article must be of in-
criminating character9' and this should be evident without
examining it.9'
The requirement of inadvertency is robbed of its meaning if agents
have unlimited secret access to residences and their contents without
the knowledge or presence of the owners. There is no such thing as
"in plain view" if all drawers and files can be opened. Even if the
warrant narrowly circumscribes the scope of the search, a defendant
has no way of knowing whether the agent remained within the
boundaries of the warrant.
Undoubtedly, many agents and law enforcement personnel would
feel compelled to comply with the letter of the warrant. However,
the risk of abuse and the subsequent intrusion into the privacy of
citizens is so severe that a covert warrant should issue unless there is
a clear showing of absolute necessity, a provision for postsearch no-
tice, and full compliance with all other provisions mandated by legis-
lation consistent with the fourth amendment.
IV. THE EFFECT OF FREITAS and VILLEGAS UPON THE ISSUANCE
OF COVERT WARRANTS
In both Freitas I and Freitas II, the courts focused on the notice
requirement needed to render the covert warrant constitutional."
The court refused to find a showing of necessity constitutionally re-
90. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
91. See Commonwealth v. Wojcik, 358 Mass. 623, 266 N.E. 2d 645 (1971) (un-
named stolen property was suppressed because the police had no probable cause to be-
lieve the articles were stolen at the time of seizure).
92. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 569-72 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(screening of an obscene film found during a search of an alleged bookmaker's bedroom
resulted in its suppression because the screening violated constitutional protections); see
also Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 361 Mass. 384, 280 N.E. 2d 665 (1972) (bonds sup-
pressed because the officer who seized them had no probable cause to believe the bonds
were stolen because he had to make a phone call to verify the ownership status of the
bonds).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 46-50.
quired 4 Because of these decisions, the threshold requirements for
covert warrants were lowered to the point where a judge could theo-
retically authorize such a warrant at any time as long as there was
an adequate provision for postsearch notice.
The court in Villegas used only the low threshold of notice, as
stated by the Freitas court, to find a covert warrant constitutional.
95
It is likely that if the next case in the Ninth Circuit dealing with
covert warrants includes a notice provision but no finding of neces-
sity, it too will pass constitutional scrutiny. Both courts found "ne-
cessity" a factor that merely strengthened the claim of constitution-
ality, but that it was not required.96
Today, there is considerable attention being focused on drugs and
the various persons involved in their manufacture, transportation,
sale, and use. The desire by all branches of government to rid the
United States of the drug problem is certainly a laudable and legal
goal. However, when the executive and legislative branches of gov-
ernment implement their policies, the judiciary should not allow the
desirability of the end to justify zealous practices which deprive citi-
zens of their basic constitutional rights under the fourth amendment.
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects. . .,7 is an important right and should only be disturbed
after a showing of necessity.
V. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SNEAK-AND-PEEK WARRANTS
A covert entry is conceivably justifiable for the following reasons:
1) to prevent the destruction of evidence; 2) to ensure the safety of
the agents involved in the operation; 3) to ensure the safety of mem-
bers of the public in the vicinity of a dangerous situation; and 4) to
allow the agents to calculate the most effective time and manner to
execute a later raid.98 While the reasons listed are by no means ex-
haustive, they are representative of possible justifications for official
authorization of a sneak-and-peek warrant. However, each of the ad-
vantages enumerated above can be present in many situations not
rising to the level of strict or absolute necessity.
In the context of drug investigations, although the rationale can
94. See supra text accompanying notes 46-50.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 64-67.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 46-50 & 64-67.
97. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
98. In Note, supra note 12, at 552, the author recognizes covert warrants may
often be justified and cites some reasons why, including those enumerated in this Note.
The author recognizes, as does this Note, that "[b]efore issuing a warrant for a covert
search, a magistrate should also require proof of a substantial risk of destruction of evi-
dence or of danger to agents or the public, and a more-than-conclusory statement in the
application that no alternative measures will satisfy the need." Id. This Note has implic-
itly included these circumstances under the "necessity" umbrella.
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easily be expanded to other hazardous situations, each of the above
justifications should be stringently limited. In the manufacture of
methamphetamine, for example, the presence of the equipment in-
volved generally will preclude immediate destruction of evidence.
While the size and output of illegal drug manufacturing laboratories
will vary in each situation, the equipment and chemicals are more
easily detected and less destructible than evidence of drug usage
alone. Unless the government is highly certain destruction of evi-
dence will result without a covert entry, this reason does not rise to
the level of necessity. A normal search warrant with no announce-
ment of initial entry may serve equally well to prevent the destrub-
tion of evidence and is a less severe intrusion than a covert entry. 9
The safety of government agents is an important objective, but
threats to safety are potentially present in all searches and arrests.
This objective could be used as a means to justify a covert search in
any potentially dangerous situation. Therefore, this argument should
rise to the level of necessity only if specific hazards are shown very
likely to be involved in the particular situation, such as booby traps
and explosive chemicals, which pose a significant and probable dan-
ger to the agents if not identified and neutralized through a prior
covert search. 10
Another justification the government may use for sneak-and-peek
warrants is the possibility of harm to the public. For example, vola-
tile chemicals used in the manufacture of drugs may explode. How-
ever, if probable cause exists to believe volatile chemicals are on the
premises, these chemicals should be seized in a regular search and
seizure operation. If there is no probable cause to believe the chemi-
cals are dangerous, then there is almost certainly no probable cause
for a covert entry.
The government may rely on another potential source of harm to
the public as a justification for sneak-and-peek warrants. It is the
potential for violence from armed suspects. It has been suggested
that a covert search warrant "seems appropriate where the potential
danger is either uncertain or depends upon how far the criminal ac-
99. In Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), the police entered the defendant's
house without giving notice of their authority and purpose. The Court excused the notice
requirements because of the need to prevent the destruction of contraband. The use of a
regular warrant with the possibility of having the notice requirement excused is arguably
a less intrusive procedure than an overall surreptitious entry. However, further develop-
ment of this idea is beyond the scope of this Note.
100. For a more detailed discussion, see Note, supra note 12 at 551.
tivity. . .has advanced."1 1 However, this standard is overbroad be-
cause it can be stretched to include myriad circumstances. In many
situations danger is a potential and agents rarely will have knowl-
edge of the specific threats involved. This rationale could be used to
justify covert entries in situations in which law enforcement person-
nel should anticipate danger will be present, and conduct the search
and arrest in a careful but regular manner, instead of resorting to
secret entries into private residences which are severe intrusions on
privacy. As before, only if the threat to public safety and the futility
of regular procedures is indeed ascertained does this justification rise
to the level of necessity required by the fourth amendment.
The final rationale, calculating the most efficient time and manner
to conduct a later search or arrest, must bow to the restrictions dis-
cussed above. These administrative justifications are not strong
enough to overcome the protections of the fourth amendment. 02
CONCLUSION
Arguably, because the fourth amendment's warrants clause re-
quires the description of things to be seized, surreptitious entries that
do not envision a seizure of evidence are proscribed by the very letter
of the fourth amendment. Assuming that surreptitious entries are
constitutional under limited circumstances, as the Dalia court ap-
peared to hold, the Freitas court's adoption of the Dalia holding is
questionable. The covert entries authorized by Dalia, unlike those in
Freitas, were limited to those necessary to install electronic surveil-
lance devices authorized pursuant to the strict limitations of Title
III.
The Dalia court did not address the new breed of sneak-and-peek
warrants at all. Dalia should not be read as giving carte blanche to
surreptitious nocturnal entries into private residences, but should be
read restrictively as permitting limited covert entries under certain
express conditions. Assuming that the Dalia holding should be ex-
tended to cover surreptitious entries, the implicit requirements of ne-
cessity as well as postsearch notice should be strictly followed in the
authorization of covert warrants.
The necessity requirement should be more stringent than that re-
quired by Title III, as the legislature has examined the practice of
electronic surveillance but has not yet examined covert warrants
which result in an even greater intrusion into the privacy of United
States citizens. A higher level of justification than the probable
101. Id. at 552.
102. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978). The Court states that "the
mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify
disregard of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
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cause for a regular warrant should be shown before a covert warrant
can issue within the constitutional limitations of the fourth
amendment.
A covert search invites violations of the fourth amendment's pro-
tection of privacy, and even if the scope of the search is narrowly
drawn, there is no check on agent conduct. Because the plain view
doctrine has no practical meaning in the context of a covert search,
any incriminating evidence found in the house, whether or not it is
named in the warrant, is potentially admissible in court. This is so
similar to the general warrants abolished by the fourth amendment
that covert warrants should not be issued unless they meet the stan-
dards articulated, including the provision for notice and a showing of
absolute necessity.
As a result of the Second Circuit's interpretation of Freitas in Vil-
legas, it appears that as long as there is an adequate provision for
postsearch notice, a judge may theoretically authorize a covert war-
rant without a showing of circumstances necessitating this extraordi-
nary measure. Although arguments against covert warrants may be
expounded by persons involved in drug manufacturing, the protec-
tions of the fourth amendment extend to all citizens. There is a po-
tential for abuse of the search warrant process in any situation.
While there are many rationales justifying sneak-and-peek war-
rants, they are generally unpersuasive unless the circumstances in
each particular case point to a showing of absolute necessity. There
should be a virtual certainty that evidence will be destroyed or that
lives are in danger before a regular search and seizure with attend-
ant protective measures will be considered insufficient and a covert
warrant issued.
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